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1Burying Our Constitution in the Sand?: Evaluating the Ostrich Response to the Use 
of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation1
I. Introduction
In the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several high-profile 
opinions that refer to international and foreign law,2 igniting a heated debate among the 
justices, legal scholars, politicians,3 and commentators regarding the proper use of 
international and foreign law in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Justice Scalia, usually 
joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, has led the fight against the use of 
foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for constitutional decision-
making.  Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White, 
have asserted that international and foreign law has relevance to their work and that is not 
inappropriate to refer to such sources in their decision-making.4
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2 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), (holding that executions of juveniles below the age of 
18 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), (striking down a Texas statute that makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex 
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), (upholding the 
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policies with respect to diversity); 
and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), (holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
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See, e.g., H.R. 446, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. 
§ 1 (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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 Chief Justice Roberts’ views on the issue are still largely unknown.  However, during his confirmation 
hearings before the Senate, Chief Justice Roberts did express concern “about the use of foreign law as 
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2The debate regarding the use of foreign and international law is really a sub-set of 
the debate about the proper method of interpreting the U.S. Constitution.  One goal of this 
article is to demonstrate that there are legitimate reasons to use these sources in 
constitutional interpretation in appropriate cases.  In fact, use of international law sources 
can be reconciled with many classic theories of constitutional interpretation.  A second 
goal is to clarify distinctions between these sources and to demonstrate how and why 
each may be used most appropriately by the Court.
Objections to the use of international law in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
are somewhat surprising in light of the fact that international law has always been part of 
U.S. law.  International law is expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution in more than 
one place.  International law acts to define the United States as a sovereign nation-state, 
with all the powers associated with that status, and imposes responsibilities upon the use 
of those powers.  U.S. constitutional concepts of individual rights and international 
human rights law share common natural law foundations and the development of each 
has greatly influenced the development of the other.
Both international and foreign law exercised a heavy influence on the framers of 
the U.S. Constitution.  In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to international 
and foreign sources in many cases throughout its history.   In light of this history, it 
would be surprising if the U.S. Supreme Court did not look to international law for 
guidance.  However, there remains much disagreement as to the use of international and 
foreign law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with respect to defining the 
scope of various individual rights.
3Despite a fairly high degree of commentary on this issue in recent times, the 
positions of the parties on both sides of this debate have not been fully explicated.  
Therefore, the bases for their respective positions are somewhat unclear.  In addition, this 
debate has been confused by the conflation of international law and foreign law sources 
and a lack of careful distinction between various sources of international law.5
Furthermore, critics, including most prominently Justice Scalia, have rightly chastised the 
Supreme Court for its selective use of foreign and international law without articulating 
clearer standards regarding the circumstances under which it is appropriate to do so.  
Accordingly, this article seeks to analyze why, when, and how international and 
foreign law is and should be used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision-making.  The 
article begins by distinguishing the two very different sources of law at issue in this 
debate – international law and foreign law.  As the article demonstrates, the use of 
international law is clearly required by the U.S. Constitution in some cases, whereas the 
use of foreign law has a weaker constitutional basis.  There are also different sources of 
international law, treaty law and customary international law, which are not always as 
clearly distinguished as they should be in the context of this debate.
The article summarizes the arguments on both sides of the debate and seeks to 
clear away some of the confusion as to what international and foreign law is being used 
5
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4and how each is being used by the current Supreme Court.   The article then examines the 
influence of international and foreign law on the U.S. Constitution, both at its inception 
and throughout its history.  This examination demonstrates that the use of international 
law by the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of individual rights is well grounded in history 
and political theory concepts of sovereignty and natural law, which recognize a 
responsibility of states to protect human rights.  
 Through this examination, the article demonstrates that, not only is it entirely 
appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to take into account international law when 
interpreting the Constitution in many cases, the Court often has an obligation to do so.  In 
fact, failing to take international law into account would be contrary to the framers’ 
intentions, violate the social compact upon which the nation is formed, and could 
undermine the Supreme Court’s legitimacy.  The article also suggests reasons why the 
Supreme Court should take international law into account in the future.  The article 
demonstrates why foreign law has a weaker historical and theoretical basis in our 
democratic system and should therefore be approached with much greater caution.  
Finally, the article proposes some guidelines for when and how international and foreign 
law should or should not be used in U.S. Constitutional interpretation in the future.
II. Clarifying the Issue 
Before delving into the arguments of the various parties, it is first necessary to 
clarify exactly what the debate is all about.  There are two very different types of law at 
issue in this debate: international law and foreign law.  These two very different types of 
law are sometimes conflated by commentators, which has served to confuse the debate on 
this subject.
5First, there is international law, which is commonly thought to be derived from 
international treaties or conventions, customary international law, general principles of 
law, and the works of jurists and scholars.6
With respect to conventional international law, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land on par with federal 
statutes.7   In the United States, treaties are made by the President, subject to the advice 
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.8  U.S. law recognizes a variety of different types 
of international agreements that create binding international obligations for the United 
States, including self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, treaties that have been 
signed by the President, but not yet ratified, and other types of Executive international 
agreements.9
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 Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) art. 38(1).
7 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2; Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).  A recent unobjectionable 
example of the use of international treaty law by a Supreme Court justice occurred in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), where the Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s admission 
policies regarding the promotion of diversity.  Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she 
observed that the Court’s holding “accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action.” Id. at 344.  In support of this statement, Justice Ginsberg cited two multilateral treaties aimed at 
eliminating discrimination, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Annex A to G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No.14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014, 
Art. 2(2) (1965), which was ratified by the United States in 1994, (see State Dept., Treaties in Force 422-
423 (June 1996)), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 46) 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
(1979) (the United States signed CEDAW in 1980, but the Senate has not yet given its advice and consent 
to ratification of the treaty).  Justice Ginsburg thus used international treaty law that is part of the supreme 
law of the United States as further justification for the holding of the case, as well as an international treaty 
which the United States has signed, but not yet ratified.
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 U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl.2.
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 Over time, it has come to be accepted practice that the President may enter into international agreements 
which are given the same legal status as treaties, even though they are not subject to the advice and consent 
of the Senate.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
6Customary international law, defined as general state practice accepted as law,10
also is binding law in the United States.  As Justice Gray of the U.S. Supreme Court 
famously stated more than a century ago:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it 
are duly presented for their determination.  For this 
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must 
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, 
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of labor research and 
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well 
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.11
Thus, the Supreme Court has a duty to ascertain whether a particular state practice has 
risen to the status of a customary international law rule or a general principle of law that 
is binding on the United States.12   If so, that rule becomes part of U.S. law.13
10
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 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  In fact, the concept of incorporating the law of nations into 
domestic law predated the U.S. Constitution.  See, e.g., Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 
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practice, as opposed to treaties) to be part of the “law” of the United States.  President Washington claimed 
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between France and Great Britain.  He also issued regulations defining specific offenses against the law of 
nations which provided the governing law until Congress passed applicable legislation.”  PHILLIP R. 
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 183 (Foundation Press 2002) 
[hereafter U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].  See also Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early 
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RELATIONS LAW at 183; see also part III(D)(3) infra.
12 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729, 124 S.Ct. 2764, 2755 (2004) (“For two centuries we 
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”).  See also Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“It is, of course, true that United States courts 
apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”); United States v. Smith, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (“The common law, too, recognises [sic] and punishes piracy as an 
offense, not against its municipal code, but as an offense against the law of nations, (which is part of the 
common law,)”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of
nations which is part of the law of the land.”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796) 
(“When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its 
modern state of purity and refinement.”).  
7The second category of law at issue in this debate is foreign law, largely 
consisting of foreign statutes or codes and decisions by the national courts of foreign 
countries.  As a general rule, foreign law, unlike international law, is not binding on the 
United States, unless there is such a consensus among the legal systems of the world that 
particular rule has gained the status of a general principle of law, in which case the rule 
may have a status akin to that of customary international law.14
The question remains, however, what does it mean to say that the United States is 
bound by a treaty provision or a rule of customary international law?  The federal courts 
have created some rules with respect to the relationship between federal statutes and 
treaties, such as the Charming Betsy rule15 and the last-in-time rule.16  But these rules do 
13
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Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).  This position has been soundly refuted by other scholars, such as 
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939); Louis Henkin, The 
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L. REV. 853, 876 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 666 and n. 221 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really 
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Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-428 (1964) and subsequent cases.  See Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?. 111 HARV. L. REV. at 1834-1838 and accompanying footnotes. 
14 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d cir. 1980) (The court noted a survey that showed that torture 
had been banned in more than 55 national constitutions, thus supporting a determination that torture is 
prohibited by customary international law.)
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“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
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 “By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of 
legislation.  Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior 
efficacy is given to either over the other.  When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always 
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of 
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date with control the other, provided always the 
stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.”  Whitney, supra note ___, at 194.  
8not address whether federal courts are required to interpret the U.S. Constitution in a 
manner that is consistent with an international law rule.  In the event it is not possible to 
reconcile the two, does international law ever trump the U.S. Constitution?  Even if 
international law does not supersede the Constitution, is there an obligation to interpret 
the Constitution in a manner consistent with international law principles similar to the 
Charming Betsy doctrine for statutes?  If yes, when?  The following sections examine 
these questions and suggest some answers.
III. Why and How Are International and Foreign Law Currently Used by the 
U.S. Supreme Court? 
The justices on the current U.S. Supreme Court largely fall into two camps with 
respect to whether and how the court should use international or foreign law in its 
jurisprudence.  A minority of the justices, usually led by Justice Scalia, has been 
outspoken against the use of foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis 
for constitutional interpretation.  The majority, on the other hand, finds international and 
foreign law to be instructive and seems increasing willing to refer to such sources in 
decision-making.
A. Justice Scalia’s “Anti-Foreign Law” Position
Justice Scalia has expressed far stronger opposition to the use of foreign legal 
materials, which he defines as statutes and judicial opinions, than he has to international 
law.  Despite his “anti-foreign law” position, he certainly does not reject the use of all 
international and foreign law.17  However, Justice Scalia has been one of the most vocal 
and colorful critics of the Supreme Court’s references to international and foreign law in 
17
 Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American 
Society of International Law (April 2, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) [hereinafter 
Scalia Keynote Address].   
9recent cases, writing several dissenting opinions in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Thomas have joined.  Because he has spoken publicly on the topic on more than 
one occasion, I have chosen to use Justice Scalia’s position to illustrate the positions of 
those who generally oppose the use of foreign and international law by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Where appropriate, I also have added criticisms made by other judges and 
scholars to more fully address all the arguments that have been raised.
As indicated above, Justice Scalia believes international and foreign law may be 
relevant in some cases.  He certainly agrees that treaties ratified by the U.S. are part of 
the supreme law of the land and he will use international law in the interpretation of a 
treaty.18   In addition, Justice Scalia has stated that: “Foreign constructions [of 
international treaties] are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting 
parties” and are therefore appropriately taken into account.19  Justice Scalia also believes 
that it is appropriate for the Court to consult foreign or international law when directed by 
a federal statute to do so, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.20    Finally, 
Justice Scalia has stated that:
foreign statutory and judicial law can be consulted in 
assessing the argument that a particular construction of an 
ambiguous provision in a federal statute would be 
disastrous.  If foreign courts have long been applying 
precisely the rule argued against, and disaster has not 
18
 Transcript of Discussion between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer at the 
American University College of Law (January 13, 2005) at 5 [hereinafter AU Transcript], available at
http:/domino.american,edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F2.
19
 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660, 124 S.Ct. 1221, 1232 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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 Scalia Keynote Address, at 305.  Although Justice Scalia would limit any claims based on the law of 
nations to the law of nations as understood in the 18th century.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
748-751, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2775-76, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment).   
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ensued, unless there is some countervailing factor at work 
the argument can safely be rejected.21
On the other hand, Justice Scalia has strenuously objected to the use of foreign 
law for two primary reasons.  First, Justice Scalia does not believe foreign legal materials
should be allowed to influence the determination of the substantive meaning of the words 
of the Constitution itself.22  Justice Scalia suggests that foreign law should not be 
authoritative because we as a nation do not “want to be governed by the views of 
foreigners.”23  Second, Justice Scalia has criticized the Court for its selective use of 
foreign law without clearly articulated standards as to when foreign law will be 
consulted.24
In addition to these two primary objections, Justice Scalia also is critical of the 
Court’s use of foreign law when it has not made a sufficient inquiry into whether the 
foreign legal system is sufficiently similar to that of the United States such that a fair 
comparisons can be made.25  If the justices use foreign law, they have to select which 
rules to follow among competing rules and there are no criteria to follow in deciding 
which foreign law to use.26
21
 Scalia Keynote Address, at 306.
22
 Scalia Keynote Address, at 307.  Justice Scalia only discusses foreign legal materials here and not 
international legal materials.  
23
 AU Transcript, at 5.
24
 Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-628 (Part III) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25
 Roper, 543 U.S. at 624.  
26
 AU Transcript, at 5.  Like Justice Scalia, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner also is concerned about 
the use of foreign and international law.  Judge Posner cites four problems with using foreign and 
international law: (1) there are too many sources, making research difficult; (2) foreign judges come from 
different “socio-historico-politico-institutional backgrounds” making accurate and fair comparisons 
difficult; (3) foreign judges have no democratic legitimacy in the U.S.; and (4) judges use foreign and 
international law to justify their own personal preferences.  See also Richard Posner, No Thanks, We 
11
B. Why some justices are willing to use international or foreign law
Justice Breyer has been one of the most outspoken justices in favor of using 
foreign and international law.  He has pointed out that foreign judges and U.S. Supreme 
Court justices are both human beings facing similar problems.27  In addition, many 
foreign societies are becoming more democratic.  Foreign judges are interpreting 
documents that protect basic human rights, as does the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights.28  For these reasons, U.S. Supreme Court justices can learn from the experience 
of foreign judges who have faced similar issues.29  Justices who favor consideration of 
international and foreign legal sources do not suggest, however, that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is in any way bound by the interpretations of these foreign judges; only that we 
may learn from them.30  Thus, this group of justices appears to be advocating for the use 
of foreign materials primarily for comparative educational purposes.
Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 40, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.html.  All of these concerns 
are addressed in Part V below.
27
 AU Transcript, at 5.  
28
 AU Transcript, at 6-7.  In her recent keynote address to the American Society of International Law, 
Justice Ginsberg noted: “an evolving appreciation that U.S. judges are not alone in the endeavor to interpret 
fundamental human rights norms and apply them to concrete cases” and opined that “[t]he U.S. judicial 
system will be the poorer, I believe, if we do not share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems 
with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.”  Ruth Bader Ginsberg, “’A Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind’: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication (April 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html. 
29
 AU Transcript, at 7.  Several of the Supreme Court justices have expressed agreement with this view.  
See Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before 
the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002).  Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that “it’s time 
for the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own 
deliberative process.”  William H. Rehnquist, Forward to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (V. Jackson and M. Tushnet, ed., 2002).
30
 AU Transcript, at 6.
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C. Recent Examples of Cases in Which International and Foreign Law 
Has Been Used by the U.S. Supreme Court
Given these different attitudes towards the use of international and foreign law in 
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, it is appropriate to examine how these sources actually 
are being used by the current Supreme Court.  As mentioned at the outset of this article, 
there have been a number of cases in the past few years in which the Supreme Court has 
referred to international or foreign law sources in its opinions.31   This section will briefly 
review some of the most relevant aspects of this recent jurisprudence.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law permitting 
the execution of mentally retarded persons.32  The Court held that imposing capital 
punishment on mentally retarded persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment because such persons have “disabilities in 
areas of reasoning, judgment and control of their impulses” and, therefore, “do not act 
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.”33  In assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment for mentally retarded 
persons, the Court stated that it must be determined whether the punishment is excessive 
based on currently prevailing moral standards.34  The Court further held that the best 
evidence of those standards is state legislation and found that the consistent trend is 
31 See cases cited in note 1.
32
 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
33
 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.  The court also held that these disabilities can jeopardize the fairness of the 
proceedings against such persons. Id.
34 Id. at 311.  The Court’s current Eight Amendment jurisprudence is based on its holding in Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958), wherein the Court held that: “The Amendment must draw its meaning from 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society.” 
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toward prohibiting capital punishment for mentally retarded persons.35   The Court then 
noted that this trend “reflects a much broader social and professional consensus,” citing 
several amicus briefs.  Of relevance here, one of the amicus briefs cited by the Court was 
the Brief for the European Union filed as Amicus Curiae in another case, McCarver v. 
North Carolina, O.T.2001, No. 00-8727, which established that “within the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”36
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Atkins ridiculing the majority’s attempt 
to find a consensus where less than a majority of states had enacted legislation outlawing 
capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals.37  He directed his harshest criticism, 
however, at the majority’s reference to the views of the “world community,” stating:
But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 
“national consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly 
relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted 
professional and religious organizations, members of the 
so-called “world community,” and respondents to opinion 
polls . . . Equally irrelevant are the practices of the world 
community, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not 
always those of our people.38
A second recent case which illustrates this debate regarding currently prevailing 
moral standards is Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court found unconstitutional a Texas 
statute that makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate 
35 Id. at 311-316.
36 Id. at 316, n. 21.  The Court also referred to an earlier case in which it had considered the views of “other 
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European 
community.”  See Id.
37 Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 347-48.
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sexual conduct because the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.39  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, used international law to refute 
earlier claims by Chief Justice Burger in Bowers v. Hardwick40 that: “Decisions of 
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention 
throughout the history of Western civilization.  Condemnation of those practices is firmly 
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.”41  Justice Kennedy pointed out 
that Chief Justice Burger’s “sweeping references . . . to the history of Western civilization 
and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other 
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.”42  Specifically, Justice Kennedy cited 
European practices in this regard, including case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, in which the European Court held that laws similar to the Texas statute were 
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.43
Once again, Justice Scalia dissented, this time joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas.44  And once again, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority’s 
reliance on the “views of a wider civilization.”45  Justice Scalia argued that Chief Justice 
39
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
40
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
41
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
42
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
43 Id. at 573.  Forty-five European nations currently ascribe to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  In addition, the Court cited an amicus brief filed by Mary 
Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which established that other 
nations have also taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to 
engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  Id. at 576.  
44 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 598.
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Burger’s statements in Bowers were mere dicta and were not the basis for the court’s 
decision.46  Therefore, there was no need for the majority in Lawrence to refute them by 
way of reference to other nations’ views on the issue.47
The most recent case involving this issue is Roper v. Simmons.48  In Roper, the 
Supreme Court was called on to reconsider whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on “cruel and unusual punishments” forbids the execution of a juvenile offender who was 
older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.  Just 15 years 
previously, in Stanford v. Kentucky,49 a divided Supreme Court upheld the ability of 
states to impose capital punishment on persons between the ages of 15 and 18.  At that 
time, the Court determined that no national consensus existed sufficient to label such 
punishment cruel and unusual.50  In Roper, the Supreme Court held that enough states 
have now abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders to warrant a finding of a 
national consensus against the execution of juvenile offenders.  As a result, a 5-4 majority 
of the Roper court held that Stanford is no longer controlling.
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Kennedy stated that the decision “finds 
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world 
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”51  The opinion 
further states that while “this reality is not controlling,” the Court “has referred to the 
46 Id.
47 Id.
48
 Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
49
 Standford, 492 U.S. 361.
50 Id. at 362.
51
 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
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laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishment’” for almost 50 
years.52  The opinion then cites several international treaties that ban the juvenile death 
penalty, including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Covenant on Human 
Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.  Of seven other 
countries that have executed juveniles since the Stanford decision, the opinion states that 
all of them have since abolished or disavowed the practice.  As a result, the Court 
concluded, “it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has 
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”53
The Court placed special emphasis on the fact that the United Kingdom has long 
since abolished the juvenile death penalty.  The Court indicated that the United 
Kingdom’s experience has particular relevance in light of the historic ties between our 
countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins (it is modeled on a parallel 
provision in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689).54  Finally, the Court concluded 
that while the overwhelming opinion of the world community against the juvenile death 
penalty is not controlling, it does provide “respected and significant confirmation” for the 
Court’s conclusions.55
Justice O’Conner wrote a dissenting opinion in which she discussed the 
appropriate use of foreign and international law.  She stated that because she believes 
52 Id. at 575.
53 Id. at 577.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 578.
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there is lack of national consensus against the juvenile death penalty, she cannot assign a 
“confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.”56  However, 
she stated that reference to foreign and international law is relevant to the Court’s 
assessment of evolving standards of decency because of the special character of the 
Eighth Amendment, which draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of a 
civilized society.  In this case, however, the existence of a global consensus cannot alter 
the fact that domestic consensus is lacking.
Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist joined, once again attacking the use of foreign and international law by 
the majority.57  Justice Scalia accused the majority of treating the views of U.S. citizens 
as “essentially irrelevant” while “the views of other countries and the so-called 
international community take center stage.”58  He pointed out that the President and the 
Senate, the political bodies charged with making and ratifying treaties, have specifically 
declined to join the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)59 and have entered a 
reservation to the ICCPR preserving the right to execute juveniles.60  According to Justice 
Scalia, these facts suggest that our country has not reached a national consensus against 
56 Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 607, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 622.
59 Id. at 622-23.  The U.S. signed the CRC in 1995, but it has not yet been presented to the Senate for its 
advice and consent. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention of the 
Rights of the Child, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2006).   
60
 It is important to note that the United States joined the ICCPR in 1992, closer in time to Stanford and at a 
time when the present national consensus did not yet exist.  See United States: Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Rep. No. 102-23 
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992) 
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the juvenile death penalty.  He also chastised the majority for not inquiring more deeply 
into whether foreign legal systems are sufficiently similar to that of the United States 
such that fair comparisons can be made.  Most fundamentally, however, Justice Scalia 
rejected outright the idea that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world.  In fact, he pointed out that when the practices of foreign nations do not conform 
to the views of the majority of the Court, those foreign practices are rejected, citing 
examples such as the Court’s establishment clause and abortion jurisprudence.61
While the Roper opinion was pending, Justice Scalia had an opportunity to 
elaborate publicly on his view of the relationship between the Court’s jurisprudence and 
foreign and international law.  Although clearly not Justice Scalia’s preferred approach, 
he recognized that in some areas of constitutional jurisprudence, beginning with the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court 
has adopted the notion that the Constitution is not static.62  Rather, the meaning of the 
constitution “changes from era to era to comport with . . . the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”63  Justice Scalia does not believe 
this approach is correct because it allows judges to decide what is best based on their own 
personal viewpoints.64  However, if one accepts the notion that it is appropriate to look to 
evolving standards of decency, Justice Scalia argues that one should only look to the 
standards of decency in American society, not the standards of decency in foreign 
61
 Roper, 543 U.S. at 625.
62
 AU Transcript, at 8.
63
 AU Transcript, at 8, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
64
 AU Transcript, at 9.  Judge Robert H. Bork has raised a similar concern in his book, COERCING VIRTUE: 
THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (American Enterprise Institute Press 2003).
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countries because foreign countries do not share our background, culture and moral 
views.65  Justice Scalia would find American standards of decency in state legislation 
because such legislation is democratically adopted by the American people.66
As will be shown below, attempts to completely “wall off” the U.S. Constitution 
from international and foreign law: (1) are contrary to the development of international 
law as incorporated into U.S. law, including the concepts of sovereignty and international 
human rights; (2) are not consistent with the Framer’s understanding of the relationship 
between individual rights, international law, and the Constitution; (3) are not supported 
by the history of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence; and (4) are not good policy.  The 
majority position of the Supreme Court better reflects this history and understanding and 
should continue to be developed through the Court’s jurisprudence.
IV. Influence of International and Foreign Law on the U.S. Constitution
From before the founding of the United States of America, international law, 
previously referred to as the law of nations, exercised a heavy influence on the 
development of the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence.  Likewise, the Framers of the Constitution were familiar with international 
and foreign law and often drew on that knowledge in deciding how to form a new nation.
65
 AU Transcript, at 9.  Justice Scalia suggests that the opinion of a “wise Zimbabwe judge or a wise 
member of the House of Lords law committee” have little to do with what Americans believe.  Id. at 11. 
While there are clearly reasons to be more cautious about the use of foreign law in constitutional decision-
making (see discussion below), Justice Scalia’s statement demonstrates an underlying assumption that 
Americans are somehow fundamentally different from persons in other countries, such that foreign laws 
and judicial decisions can never be relevant to Americans.  This view is one of the underlying assumptions 
that separates Justice Scalia from other justices, like Justice Breyer, who views the world as full of human 
beings with common problems and struggles who can learn from one another’s experiences.  Id. at 10-11.  
66
 AU Transcript, at 17. Responses to Justice Scalia’s concerns regarding judges’ basing their decisions on 
personal preferences and a lack of democratic legitimacy are addressed infra in Part V of this article.
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Two areas of international law are particularly relevant to the creation and 
development of the United States as a constitutional government and its protection of 
individual rights.  First, the international law concept of sovereignty helped the fledging 
United States to gain international recognition and imposed obligations on the federal 
government vis-à-vis other nations, as well as towards its own subjects.  As explained 
below, the concept of sovereignty has continued to evolve, which in turn has implications 
for a state such as the United States claiming to be sovereign.  Second, the evolution of 
the meaning of sovereignty paralleled the development of international human rights law.  
International human rights law was greatly influenced by individual rights jurisprudence 
that had developed under the U.S. Constitution.  Both sovereignty and international 
human rights law have their roots in natural law concepts and the evolution of each has 
impacted the development of the other.  Concepts of natural law, sovereignty and, later, 
human rights, all influenced the framing of the Constitution and its interpretation over the 
past two centuries.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to take these sources into account both 
to understand the original goals and purposes of the Constitution and to understand how 
the Constitution should be interpreted and applied today.67  Thus, this next section will 
focus on the development of these two aspects of international law, their impact on U.S. 
constitutional law, and their relevance for this current constitutional debate.
67
 Professor Cass Sunstein might label this reasoning a form of “soft originalism,” which he defines as 
making a historical inquiry “not to obtain specific answers to specific questions, but instead to get a more 
general sense of goals and purposes.”  CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173 
(Oxford University Press 1996).
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A. Natural Law Foundations of International Law  
Both the international law of sovereignty and international human rights law 
developed from concepts of natural law.68  Natural law, in turn, is sometimes said to be 
synonymous with and sometimes said to be derived from divine law.69 Both divine law 
and natural law are considered “higher law” that is universally applicable and superior to 
positive law created by governments.70   One of the primary differences between the two 
is that divine law is said to come from God, whereas some theorists suggested that natural 
law is a product of “right reason.”71  The next section elaborates on how natural law 
theories laid the foundation for the international law of sovereignty and international 
human rights law.   
B. International Law of Sovereignty
The concept of sovereign states grew out of natural law concepts of equality of 
persons, 72  but transformed the equality of persons into an equality of states.  Over time, 
68
 Jay, supra note __ , at  821-22.  “The ‘law of nations’ and ‘the law of nature’ were closely allied 
concepts for [Chief Justice] Marshall and his contemporaries.”  G. Edward White, The United Sates 
Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: History: The Marshall Court and International Law: 
The Piracy Cases, 83 A.J.I.L. 727, 728 (1989). 
69
 Jay, supra note __ at 822-23.  Some scholars have suggested that the existence o f divine law is 
evidenced by the universality of certain religious beliefs.  For example, all the major religions of the world 
adopt a version of what the Christians call the “Golden Rule,” i.e., “do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you.” PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS 
SEEN 5 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed. 2003).
70 CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE HIGHER LAWS:  ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v. (William S. 
Hein & Co. 1994).  Antieau provides examples of the universality of divine and natural law from Ancient 
Greek, Roman and Chinese philosophers, as well as from Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.  Id. at 2, 6, 20-
21, 28.
71 ANTIEAU, supra note __ , at 49; MAURICE WILLIAM CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 10-11 
(Taplinger Pub. Co. 1973).
72 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 309 (Cambridge University Press 1960).  Equality of 
persons is said to be part of divine law, as it is a basic tenet of many major faiths, including Judaism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.  LAUREN, supra note __ at 6-8, 11.
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the concept of sovereignty has changed and grown to have a number of different 
meanings and aspects.73  This evolution, in turn, affects what it means for a state like the 
United States that claims to be sovereign.  Thus, this next section examines the evolving 
concept of sovereignty in an effort to understand how the concept of sovereignty affected 
the founding of the United States and the drafting of the new constitution and how its 
continuing evolution over the last two centuries has impacted the United States.
1. Evolving definition of sovereignty
The French philosopher, Jean Bodin is often credited with first stating the theory 
of sovereignty in his 1576 Six Livres de la republic.74  Bodin asserted that sovereignty is 
defined as power absolute and perpetual, “supreme,” and “subject to no law.”75  Only a 
state possessed the power to decide how it would treat its people within its own borders 
and those under its control elsewhere.76  Thomas Hobbes concurred in The Leviathan.77
Thus, traditional definitions of sovereignty often emphasized the powers or rights of the 
sovereign, and not its responsibilities.
73
 For a description of the historical roots of the concept of sovereignty, see JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW 
WITHOUT NATIONS?  WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATE? 47-62
(Princeton University Press 2005).
74 See F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 71 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1986); Ivan Simonovic, State 
Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381, 382 
(2000).
75 JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIC 1:179-228; 295-310 (Fayard 1986) (1576). 
76 Id. Stephen Krasner refers to a state’s ability to exclude external actors from a given territory as 
Westphalian sovereignty and a state’s ability to exercise effective control within its borders as domestic 
sovereignty.  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3-4 (Princeton University 
Press 1999).
77 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 120-128 (Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
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While Bodin argued that the sovereign was not subject to positive law because the 
sovereign creates the positive laws, the sovereign is still bound by the laws of nature.78
Likewise, St. Thomas Aquinas and his followers believed that the Pope could be 
disciplined if he violated divine or natural law.79  Hugo Grotius also attempted to 
reconcile the concept of an independent and all powerful sovereign with the concept of 
natural law, to which the sovereign was still subject.80  He theorized that the original 
sovereignty of the people was transferred to a sovereign government, which had the 
function and duty to protect the people in exchange.81  This theme was carried forward in 
John Locke’s SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in which he emphasizes the social 
contract between the people and the sovereign government.  These concepts of 
sovereignty formed the basis of the modern nation-state, with Locke’s social contract 
theory having special relevance for the United States. 
Many of the founding fathers were heavily influenced by the theories of John 
Locke.  In his SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, Locke asserted that everyone is born 
into a state of nature in which everyone is equal and is perfectly free to do as they choose 
within the bounds of the laws of nature.82   Life in this state of nature is uncertain and 
constantly exposed to invasion by others.83  Men act as judges in their own cases and 
78
 Simonovic, supra note __, at 383; see also RABKIN, supra note __, at 55.  To the contrary, Hobbes’s 
sovereign was not subject to any law, including natural law.  HINSLEY, supra note __, at 142-143.  Hobbes’ 
ideas ultimately were rejected in favor of those of John Locke.  Id. at 146-149.
79 HINSLEY, supra note __, at 95.
80 HINSLEY, supra note __, at 139.
81 See Id.
82 LOCKE, supra note ___, at 309.
83 Id. at 395.
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have a tendency to be partial to their own cases and those of their friends.84  As a result, 
individuals will choose to give up some of their freedom to form a political society or 
civil government, the purpose of which is to remedy the inconveniences of the state of 
nature and protect the lives, liberties, and property of the persons in the society.85  In this 
political society, every man obligates himself to every other man to submit to the 
determination of the majority and to be bound by it.86  Locke calls this state of affairs a 
social compact.87
The American Revolution took Locke’s theories and put them into practice.  The 
idea of popular sovereignty became the basis of political legitimacy.  Several of the 
founding documents contain the word sovereignty, including the Declaration and 
Resolves of the First Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Articles of Confederation.88  The people of the thirteen colonies consented to the exercise 
of power over them by a federal government in exchange for the protection of that 
government.89  Thus, partly as a result of Locke’s ideas and certain political movements 
such as the American and French Revolutions, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
84 Id. at 316.
85 Id. at 316, 367, 395.
86 Id. at 376.
87 Id.
88 See Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 154-155 (ed. B. Frohnen 2002); Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) reprinted 
in reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 189 (ed. B. Frohnen 2002).  See also RABKIN, supra note __ , at 
45 (In fact, “[i]n the text of The Federalist Papers, . . . the terms ‘sovereign’ and ‘sovereignty’ appear more 
often than ‘freedom’ . . . ‘republic’ . . . or ‘morals.’”).
89 See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 
A.J.I.L. 866, 867 (1990).
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changed from an emphasis on the sovereignty of the state to an emphasis on the 
sovereignty of the people.
2. Modern Concepts of Sovereignty
The meaning of sovereignty has not remained static since that time.  More recent 
political pronouncements and scholarly treatments of the subject of sovereignty have 
rightly given greater emphasis to the duality of the concept of sovereignty and the idea 
that it has both internal and external aspects.90  In 2000, the government of Canada 
spearheaded the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), which concluded that: “[S]overeignty implies a dual responsibility: 
externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the 
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.”91  This theme has been echoed 
by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan92 and the U.N. High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change.  In its recent report, the U.N. High-Level Panel stated:  
“In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges 
of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities.  Whatever perceptions may have 
prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, 
today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own 
peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.”93   Thus, 
90
 Simonovic, supra note __, at 384.  See also Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International 
Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1685, 1689 (1995).
91
 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect 8 (International Development Research Centre 2001).  
92
 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Addresses International Peace Academy Seminar on 
‘The Responsibility to Protect,’ U.N Doc. SG/SM/8125 (Feb. 15, 2002).
93
 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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sovereignty has an external component which concerns relations with other states and an 
internal component which concerns relations between the government and the governed.
a. External Aspects of Sovereignty
The external component of sovereignty relates to the international law of 
sovereignty, which defines the criteria for statehood and recognition as an equal member 
of the international community and regulates how nations are to behave toward one 
another.94  Emphasizing the international law aspects of sovereignty, the International 
Court of Justice has defined sovereignty as:  “The whole body of rights and attributes 
which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states, and also in its 
relations with other states.”95  Thus, under international law, the concept of sovereignty 
bestows an equality of states and independence of action.96  It is reflected in international 
law in a variety of ways, such as in the United Nations Charter.97  Thus, the concept of 
sovereignty derives from and is part of international law and sovereign states must take 
international law into account when exercising their sovereign powers.
These external or international aspects of sovereignty were crucial to the 
formation of the new United States of America.98   They guaranteed her independence 
94
 Stephen Krasner refers to “the practices of mutual recognition” of states as “international legal 
sovereignty.”  KRASNER, supra note __, at 3.
95 Corfu Channel Case (ICJ 1949), available at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/
idecisions/isummaries/Iccsummary490409.htm.
96
 Simonovic, supra note __, at 384.  Brierly states that natural rights of states generally include the rights 
of self-preservation, independence, equality, respect, and intercourse.  J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PIECE 49 (Oxford University Press, 1963).
97 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(1). (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”).
98
 Harold Hongju Koh, The United States Constitution and International Law: International Law as Part of 
Our Law, 98 A.J.I.L. 43, 44 (2004). (“The framers and early Justices understood that the global legitimacy 
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and equality among the community of states.99  They ensured her ability to enter into 
contracts, i.e., treaties and other international agreements, with other states and to enforce 
those contractual obligations.100
While international law is still concerned with the protection of these aspects of 
sovereignty, it now recognizes that sovereignty ultimately rests in the people.  It is the 
object of modern international law to protect those people, not the authority wielding 
power.101  As a result, under international law today, sovereignty can be violated by an 
outside force or by an internal force that acts contrary to the wishes of the people.102
Thus, the concept of sovereignty today places more emphasis on its internal aspects. 
b. Internal Aspects of Sovereignty
This internal component of sovereignty requires that the sovereign state abide by 
its social contract with the people.  In the United States, this social contract is embodied 
by the U.S. Constitution.  Pursuant to this social contract, the people gave up certain 
freedoms and submitted themselves to the authority of the federal government, in 
exchange for certain protections from the government. Since pre-revolutionary times, it 
has been accepted that the primary purpose of the government is the good of the 
of a fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the 
international system within which it sought acceptance.”).
99
 Jay, supra note ___, at 839-40.  See also RABKIN, supra note __, at 93-94, 112-113.
100
 Jay, supra note __,  at 828.
101
 Reisman, supra note __ , at 872.
102 See Id.
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people.103  Thus, the government has the right to make and enforce certain laws for the 
public welfare, but also has the duty to protect the people within its territory.  
3. Influence of sovereignty theory on the United States
The founders of the United States clearly believed in both the external and 
internal components of sovereignty theory and their natural law underpinnings.  The 
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress provided:  
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North 
America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of 
the English constitution, and the several charters or 
compacts, have the following Rights:
Resolved, N.C.D.
1. That they are entitled to life, liberty, and 
property, & they have never ceded to any 
sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of 
either without their consent.
2. That our ancestors, who first settled these 
colonies were at the time of their emigration 
from the mother country, entitled to all the 
rights, liberties and immunities of free and 
natural-born subjects within the realm of 
England.104
This theme of consent to be governed by way of a social contract based on natural 
law principles was carried forward in the Declaration of Independence:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary 
for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have 
connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel the separation.
103 Edwin S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV.
149, __ (1928) (Locke insisted that the public good be the object of legislation and of government action in 
general.).   See also MARY BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-
23 (Duke University Press 1928).
104
 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 154-155 (ed. B. Frohnen 2002) (emphasis added).
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed. 105
Finally, the preamble to the U.S. Constitution itself makes it clear that the 
“People” are coming together to form a compact for the purpose of creating a better life 
for themselves:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.106
Thus, the constitutional government of the United States is founded upon natural 
law theories of equality of persons and states, social contract theory, and the idea that the 
primary purpose of the government is the protection and betterment of the people, all of 
which are part of the modern concept of sovereignty. 
In recognition of this history, sovereignty has been used by the Supreme Court as 
a source of federal power, rights and duties.  For example, in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 
the Supreme Court found that sovereignty implied an authority to deal with matters 
relating to immigration, even though the power to regulate immigration was not expressly 
105
 Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) reprinted in reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 189 (ed. 
B. Frohnen 2002) (emphasis added).  Many religious leaders were chosen to assist in the work of making 
the new Constitution and many of their resolutions and instructions stressed natural law doctrines.  
BALDWIN, supra note ___, at 13-136, 144.
106 U.S. CONST., preamble.  
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given to the federal government in the Constitution.107  Likewise, there is no express 
constitutional grant of legislative power to Congress to make laws with respect to 
maritime matters, yet the federal courts have implied such a grant in part by virtue of the 
“ancient jurisdiction” inherent in admiralty of sovereign states108 and the grant of judicial 
power in Article III § 2 to federal courts to hear cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.109  There also is no general foreign affairs power in the Constitution, but in 
Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland stated that the foreign affairs power of the federal 
government came not from the states when they signed and ratified the U.S. Constitution, 
but from international law concepts of sovereignty.110  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
ascribed to these sovereignty theories and used them to justify action by the federal 
government.  In so doing, the Court must also accept the duties that come with being a 
sovereign state –the primary duty of which is to conduct the government for the benefit 
of the people.
107 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being 
an incident of sovereignty . . . .”); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to 
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such 
cases and under such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”).  See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18-26 (Oxford University Press, 1972). [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS]
108
 Delovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 7 F.Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 572
(1874);  see also FRANK MARAIST & THOMAS GALLIGAN, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 5 (2005).
109
 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 245 U.S. 
655 (1917); Romero v.  International Terminal Operating Co., 359 U.S.962 (1959).
110
 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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C. Individual Rights in the US
Natural law theories exercised a heavy influence on the founding fathers not only 
with respect to ideas of sovereignty and social compacts, but also with respect to ideas of 
individual rights.111
1. Natural law underpinnings of individual rights in the U.S. 
Constitution
Most scholars agree that the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were 
committed to the idea of natural rights in the context of social contract political theory.112
In particular, the reasoning of John Locke and the example of the English Bill of Rights 
had a great influence on the U.S. Bill of Rights.113  Several of the founding fathers were 
ardent adherents to natural rights theory, including James Wilson, James Madison,114 and 
111
 While natural law theory was largely overtaken by positivist legal theory over the next century and a 
half, it has never been completely abandoned by the Supreme Court with respect to individual rights theory.  
It also regained credence in international law theory around the time of World War II in response to the 
actions of many totalitarian governments, which were largely authorized by positive law but which were 
clearly contrary to a broader understanding of human rights.  See Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties 
in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571 (1937).  See also, Roger Alford, In Search of a Theory for 
Constitutional Comparitivism, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 639, 663-64 (2005).
112
 Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” by the 
People, 16 SO. IL. L.J. 267, 271 (1992) (“The ratification debates over the Constitution are filled with the 
rhetoric of natural and inalienable rights, and both sides in the debate stood as pretenders to the guardian of 
such rights.”).  See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The 
Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 177, 179 (1988) (“It seems indubitable 
that the founding fathers believed in some form of ‘natural law’ and in some basic, unchanging standards of 
morality and political justice.”); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process 
and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1983).  But see John Hart Ely, The Ninth 
Amendment in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 39, 50 (Harvard University Press 1980) (Ely argues that 
although the Constitution was “informed by natural law, this theme was far from universally accepted and 
probably was not even the majority view among those ‘framers’ we would be likely to think of first.”  
However, Ely acknowledges the importance of natural law, stating that while natural law is too vague to 
create rules, it would be “folly . . . to ignore it as a source of constitutional values.”). 
113 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 1, 6 (Columbia University Press 1990); CRANSTON, supra note __ , at 1; 
Edward S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 
(1928) (“The conveyance of natural law ideas into American constitutional theory was the work 
preeminently – though by no means exclusively – of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government.”).
114 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT 12-25, 36-37(George Mason University Press 1989).
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John Adams.115  Likewise, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson believed that there were 
natural rights which could not be restrained or repealed by human laws.116
In pre-revolutionary America, religious and political leaders (who were often one 
and the same) affirmed that positive laws must be in accord with divine law and natural 
law.117  For example, in 1717, John Wise, a distinguished Massachusetts clergyman, 
preached that it is because “God does not permit it, that rulers cannot invade the rights 
and liberties of the people.”118  In 1744, Reverend Elisha Williams observed that arbitrary 
governments are not really governments, but tyrants, and are absolutely against the laws 
of God and nature.119  Richard Bland, a cousin of Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, wrote 
in 1766 that government is only lawful as long as “it will conduce to [men’s] happiness, 
which they have a natural right to promote.”120 According to all these men, when 
government violates higher law, the government may be disrespected.121  Governments 
were obliged to obey God’s law and to serve God’s people.122
115
 Corwin, supra note __, at __  citing 2 Adams, Life and Works 374 (C.F. Adams, ed. 1850) (John Adams 
recorded in his diary that he ‘was strenuous for retaining and insisting on [the law of nature].’).
116 BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE – THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW, (Harvard University 
Press 1974) [hereinafter BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE].  
117 ANTIEAU,  supra note ___, at 12.  In fact, many clergy of this period saw natural law and divine law as 
synonymous.  BALDWIN, supra note ___, at 14-15, 22.
118 ANTIEAU, supra note ___ , at 12.
119 See Id.
120 ANTIEAU, supra note ___, at 135.  According to Mary Baldwin, “the social compact theory seems to
have been accepted without question by the ministers of both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”  
BALDWIN, supra note __ , at 25.  
121 ANTIEAU, supra note ___ , at 12.  See also BALDWIN, supra note ___, at 19. 
122 BALDWIN, supra note ___, at 16, 23. 
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As quoted above, the 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental 
Congress included natural law concepts regarding entitlement to life, liberty and 
property.123  This was followed by the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, which foreshadowed 
the Declaration of Independence, and asserted several natural rights, including the right 
of equality, the right to enjoy life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property, the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, the right to alter or abolish a 
government that does not act for the public good, the right to suffrage, the right of due 
process, the right not to be punished in any cruel or unusual manner, the right to freedom 
of the press, and the right of freedom of religion.124  Other states’ bills of rights also 
contained similar natural rights guarantees.
The Declaration of Independence followed shortly thereafter and was heavily 
influenced by Locke’s natural law theories as well.125  It suggests a right of self-
determination based on natural law126 and then lists several inalienable rights, including 
equality of man, and the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.127
123
 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 154-155 (ed. B. Frohnen 2002), supra note __.
124
 Virginia Bill of Rights, June 12, 1776, reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES (B. 
Frohnen, ed. 2002).
125
 Brierly, supra note __ , at 50.
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 “When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political 
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate 
and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”  The 
Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES (B. 
Frohnen, ed. 2002).
127
 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”  
Id.  Of course, the Declaration’s reference to all men was meant literally to include only men and not 
women, but was not to be read literally to include all men.  The legal recognition of the fact that all persons 
shared these natural rights came later with the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments.
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In proposing the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, James Madison suggested 
certain amendments that he believed should properly be recommended by the Congress to 
the States, including the following: 
First.  That there be prefixed to the Constitution a 
declaration, that all power is originally vested in, and 
consequently derived from, the people.
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for 
the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using 
property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform or change their government, 
whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes 
of the institution.128
In addition to these expressly enumerated rights, Madison’s proposed amendments also 
included references to unenumerated rights retained by the people:  
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made 
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to 
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the 
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the 
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such 
powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.129
This language came to be the present-day Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The first government of United States also demonstrated its commitment to 
natural rights in connection with an incident that occurred during the French war with 
Great Britain in 1793.  Three months after the declaration of war by France in February 
128
 James, Madison, Speech Introducing Proposed Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), reprinted in
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES at 338.  
129 Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
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1793, President George Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality on the part of the 
United States.  Several difficult questions arose as to the United States’ rights and duties 
as a neutral country.  Accordingly, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, at President 
George Washington’s request, wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court to solicit the justices’ 
advice regarding the international law of neutrality.  In this letter, Jefferson asks the 
Supreme Court’s opinion as to both international law and the law of nature:
The war which has taken place among the powers of 
Europe produces frequent transactions within our ports and 
limits, on which questions arise of considerable difficulty, 
and of greater importance to the peace of the United States.  
These questions depend for their solution on the 
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and 
nations, and on the law of the land, and are often presented 
under circumstances which do not give a cognizance of 
them to the tribunals of the country.130
The Supreme Court declined to provide the requested guidance for jurisprudential 
reasons.  However, the correspondence is relevant in demonstrating the importance of 
natural law and international law to the early republic.  As at least one scholar has 
suggested, “the modern debate is not over whether it was a central end of the Constitution 
to secure natural rights, but the relationship of such natural rights to the law of the 
Constitution.”131   This relationship is the subject of some of the following sections of this 
article.
This section has established that the drafting of the U.S. Constitution was strongly 
influenced by concepts of both divine law and natural law.132  The Constitution is the
130
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the U.S. Supreme Court (July 1793), reprinted in CALVIN MASSEY, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 74 (Aspen Publishers 2001) (emphasis added).
131
 McAffee, supra note __ at 271.
132 ANTIEAU, supra note __ , at 12, 107, 109, 131, 135.   
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supreme positive law that protects individual rights.133  It was drafted to carry out the 
promises and aspirations set forth in the Declaration of Independence, which, as 
demonstrated above, relied heavily on natural law theories of a social compact between 
the people and the government and the idea of inherent individual rights.134
The problem with natural law was and is, of course, that it is so hard to ascertain 
exactly what the “rules” of natural law are.  As Professor Ely points out, natural law has 
historically been invoked to “support all manner of causes in this country – some worthy, 
others nefarious.”135  Thus, while natural law may inform our constitutional 
understandings, it has fallen out of favor as a method of creating rules for decision.  As 
discussed below, I suggest here that international human rights principles are the 
successor to natural law theory and provide more concrete rules of decision that can 
better inform our constitutional jurisprudence.
2. Unenumerated Rights under the U.S. Constitution
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the years to locate the 
source and define the scope of rights not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it has 
frequently declared that such rights exist and has taken on the role of guarantor of such 
rights.  In finding and defining the existence and scope of such rights, some justices have 
relied on natural law concepts, others on the Ninth Amendment and others on the due 
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendment, or some combination thereof. 
133 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __ , at 84.
134 Id. at 84-85.  
135 ELY, The Ninth Amendment, supra note ___ , 50.  
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a. The influence of natural law theories on the U.S. 
Supreme Court as the basis of unenumerated rights
While not overwhelming in number, there have been several justices in the history 
of the U.S. Supreme Court who have demonstrated their awareness of the role of natural 
law in the framing of the Constitution and the corresponding appropriateness of using 
such theories in constitutional interpretation.  What follows is a brief survey of some of 
the more important opinions in this regard.
James Wilson, an early justice of the Supreme Court, believed strongly in the 
existence of natural law.136  “[I]n his view human law was grounded on the consent of 
those whose obedience the law required.  He thus linked the doctrine of natural law with 
the theory of popular sovereignty.”137  Like Locke, Wilson believed that the state was 
founded on the compact of its members, who united together for the common benefit.  
According to Wilson, each man had a natural right to his property, his character, his 
liberty and his safety.138  At least one scholar has described James Wilson’s philosophy 
as “the most consistent expression of classical American philosophy of law and 
government” and has stated that it was shared by most of the fathers of the 
Constitution.139
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story also was a firm believer in the existence of 
natural law.140  In deciding The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, Justice Story took the 
136 BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra  note __ , at 51, citing JAMES WILSON, WORKS, I, 49 (J.D. 
Andrews, ed., Chicago, 1896). 
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 BODENHEIMER. JURISPRUDENCE, supra  note __ , at 52.
140
 Joseph Story, Essay on Natural Law, reprinted in 34 Ore. L. Rev. 88 (1955).  
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position that a strong international trend against the slave trade, evidenced by numerous 
international declarations as well as by some municipal statutes directed against its 
legality, might justify judicial recognition of a rule of international law condemning such 
trade even though the institution of slavery had not been outlawed as unjust by some of 
the leading nations of the world.141
In Chisholm v. Georgia,142 a case involving the question of whether an action in 
assumpsit may lie against a state, several of the justices referred to natural law principles 
in their respective opinions.  Similarly, in Calder v. Bull,143 a case involving the probate 
of a will, Justice Chase based his opinion on social compact theory and argued that any 
act of a legislature that is contrary to the principles of the social compact cannot be 
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.144
b. The Role of the Ninth Amendment
The influence of the idea of natural rights on the U.S. Constitution is particularly 
evident in the language of the Ninth Amendment which states: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.”145  This language recognizes that the people possessed rights that existed 
141
 United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 
15,511). 
142
 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall. 419) (1793).
143
 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
144
 Justice Iredell disputed this idea, arguing that the courts do not have the power to declare a law void as 
violative of natural justice.  Id. at __.  For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s use of natural law 
theory, see Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, supra note ___ , at 659-68.
145 U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
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prior to the U.S. Constitution; they were not created by the Constitution. 146   The partial 
listing in the Constitution of some of those antecedent rights should not be read in such a 
way as to undermine the existence or scope of any other non-enumerated rights that were 
“retained by the people.”147
In the contraceptive case of Griswold v. Connecticut,148 for example, Justice 
Douglas cited the Ninth Amendment in support of his opinion and stated that the court 
was “deal[ing] with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,”149 leaving no doubt 
as to his belief in preexisting unenumerated constitutional rights (although he attempted 
to tie those unenumerated rights to enumerated rights through “penumbras” and 
“emanations”).  Likewise, in his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated his view 
that, “the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the 
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from 
governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically 
mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.”150
Some scholars have disputed the idea that U.S. citizens have any rights that may 
be protected by the government apart from those expressly enumerated in the 
146 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __  , at 86.  See also Bennett B. Patterson, THE FORGOTTEN 
NINTH AMENDMENT ___ (1955), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note __ , at 107.
147 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __  , at 86-87.
148
 Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
149 Id. at 486.
150 Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  See also Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the States at the time of 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects. U.S. Const. Amend. 9.”) 
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Constitution.151  The fear seems to be that once we admit that unenumerated rights exist, 
judges will be free to exercise unlimited discretion in identifying and enforcing such 
rights.152  To address this concern, it is argued that only the democratically elected and 
more politically accountable Congress should be the arbiter of such rights.  If Congress 
has not recognized the right, it does not exist as an enforceable right.153
But denying the existence and protection of preexisting unenumerated rights is 
contrary to the language of the documents on which this country was founded.  For 
example, the Declaration of Independence refers to “inalienable rights,” which means 
that these rights are “incapable of being alienated, surrendered or transferred.”154  Thus, it 
is not possible for the people to give any of their inalienable rights to the government.  
The Ninth Amendment assumes the existence of certain unnamed rights.  If Congress has 
to enumerate the right before it may be protected by any branch of government, these 
151
 Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1, __ (1980), excerpted in BARNETT, supra
note __ , at 191, 192. 
152
 For example, Raoul Berger suggests that if we adopt Justice Goldberg’s view of the ninth amendment in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, we “would transform the ninth amendment into a bottomless well in which 
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BORK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note __ at 8-9.
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 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 607 (1990).  While the Supreme Court generally does not 
rely on the Declaration of Independence as a legally enforceable document standing alone, the Declaration 
may certainly be used to inform our understanding of what the Framers thought they were doing during the 
process of creating a new government.  
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words have no meaning.155  And if the judiciary, as a part of the government, cannot 
protect those unenumerated rights, then those rights either have little, if any, substance, or 
essentially have been alienated contrary to the intention of the framers.156
International human rights law can help to address the concerns of some scholars 
that allowing the recognition and protection of unenumerated rights opens a Pandora’s 
Box of limitless judicial discretion.  If judges take into consideration the existence and 
scope of a right under international human rights law in the context of deciding whether 
such a right exists in our own constitutional jurisprudence, such reference can help to 
shape and limit judges’ abilities to create new rights or expand existing rights.  If no such 
right is expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, and no such right can be found in 
international human rights law, a federal judge would be hard-pressed to justify the 
recognition of such a right.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the only rights that are part of the Constitution 
and that may be protected by the government are the ones expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution, international law could and should be used to help define the contours of 
those rights that are expressly mentioned.  In this way, international law would still have 
a role in constitutional interpretation as to the meaning of ambiguous terms such as due 
process, cruel and unusual punishment, and habeas corpus.  
155 Professor Tom McAffee attempts to reconcile the idea of “inalienable rights” with the need for written 
law protecting those rights.  McAffee, supra note __, at 276-280.  Despite the fact that such rights are 
“inalienable,” he suggests that such rights may “be granted away in law by the people’s design or neglect.”
Id. at 280.  Not only is this suggestion inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used, it also is 
inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment’s command that the unenumerated rights shall not be denied or 
disparaged.  Simeon C.R. McIntosh, On Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 28 How. 
L.J. 913, 915 (1985), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note __ , at 219, 225. 
156
 McIntosh, supra note __ , at 919, excerpted in BARNETT, supra note __ , at 219, 224. Some scholars 
may be confusing the existence of such rights with the methods chosen to protect them. See e.g., Raoul 
Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 8 (1980) (who believes it was left for the states to 
protect those rights), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note __ , at 191.  
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c. Substantive Due Process 
Perhaps because of this debate regarding the appropriate role and meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has more recently grounded unenumerated 
“fundamental rights” in the concept of substantive due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.157
Some scholars have demonstrated that natural law philosophy heavily influenced 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and especially the due process 
clause, during the Court’s early history.158  For example, in Savings and Loan Assoc. v. 
Topeka,159 the Supreme Court stated:
There are . . . rights in every free government beyond the 
control of the state.  A government which recognized no 
such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, the property of 
its citizens subject at all times to the absolute power, is 
after all but a despotism . . . There are limitations on such 
power which grow out of the essential nature of all free 
governments, implied reservations of individual rights, 
without which the social compact could not exist, and 
which are respected by all governments entitled to the 
name.160
Similarly, the Court has repeatedly held that while “[t]he Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any right of privacy . . . one aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the 
157
 In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976), Justice Stevens wrote: “I had thought it self-evident that 
all men were endowed by the Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights.  It is that basic 
freedom which the Due Process clause protects. . . .”  Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note __ , at 50, citing J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law 
Background of Due Process, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 56 (1931); Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of Due Process 
of Law: Prior to the Adopting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 Cal. L. Rev. 583, 588-89 (1930).
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 Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 1874 WL 17323, (1874).  
160 Id. at * 6.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.’”161  And while the Court has never 
defined the outer limits of the right of privacy, its decisions have extended that right to 
include a variety of personal decisions a person may make without unjustified 
governmental interference, such as the right of parents to make decisions about child-
rearing and education,162 the right of couples to make decisions about procreation,163
contraception,164 abortion,165 and marriage.166  In Meyer, the Court defined liberty 
broadly to “denote[] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of an 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”167
Accordingly, on numerous occasions, the Court has been willing to find rights to 
be protected by the Constitution that are not expressly mentioned therein.  One reason the 
161
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In Prince, the Supreme Court stated: “[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child resides first with the 
parents . . . and it is in recognition of this that [prior Supreme Court] decisions have respected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
163
 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 525, 541-42 (1942).
164
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166
 Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
167 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
44
Court may have been willing to do so is the influence of the growing body of 
international human rights law that recognizes certain universal, fundamental rights that 
belong to all persons, regardless of their specific expression in the positive domestic law 
of a state.
The Supreme Court has thus assumed the role of guarantor of natural or 
unenumerated rights by way of its power to review the acts of the other branches of 
government and determine whether those acts are consistent with higher law principles, 
whether those rights are grounded in natural law, the Ninth Amendment or the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.168
D. The Emergence of International Human Rights Law
American notions of individual rights both contributed to the development of 
international human rights law and, more recently, have been influenced by that growing 
body of international law in turn.  Accordingly, this next section briefly traces the 
development of international human rights law and its influence on U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence of individual rights. 
1. Evolution from natural law to international human rights law
Like the international law of sovereignty, the international human rights law is 
founded on natural law.  However, exactly the opposite of early sovereignty theories, 
early theories of divine and natural law focused on universal responsibilities of man 
rather than rights.169  Several historical events, including the decline of feudalism, the 
168 Hamilton and Jefferson shared the view that it was the function of the courts to defend human rights 
against intrusions by the legislature. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE supra  note __at 52, citing Hamilton 
in Federalist essay no. 78 and Jefferson’s Letters to F. Hopkinson, March 13, 1789, and to J. Madison, 
March 15, 1789, in the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. J.P. Boyd (Princeton, 1958), XIV, 650, 659. 
169 LAUREN, supra note __ at 13.
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expansion of commerce, and an emerging middle class, contributed to a growing interest 
in the concept of rights.170  In 1761, Thomas Paine produced THE RIGHTS OF MAN which 
introduced the specific expression “human rights.” 171
Both religious beliefs and moral and political philosophy contributed to the 
development of international human rights.172  One author states it thus: “Human rights is 
a twentieth-century name for what has been traditionally known as natural rights or, in a 
more exhilarating phrase, the rights of man.”173   Human rights law is rooted in natural 
law.174  Some scholars have suggested that the very idea of human rights is “ineliminably 
religious.”175  Other scholars have suggested that it is just this connection to “higher law” 
or natural law that has caused some scholars and judges to be apprehensive when 
approaching human rights claims.176
2. U.S. participation in the development of international human rights
While the idea of human rights has been around for several centuries, modern 
international human rights law only really developed in a concrete form following World 
War II.177  It found expression in the United Nations Charter,178 the 1948 Universal 
170 Id.
171 THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 18 (New York: Heritage Press, 1961 ed.).
172 LAUREN, supra note __  at 10-13.
173 CRANSTON, supra note __ , at 1. 
174 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note ___ , at 1. (although Henkin suggests that “the contemporary 
version does not ground or justify itself in natural law”).  See also CRANSTON, supra note __ , at 7; Robert 
J. Araujo, The Catholic Neo-Scholastic Contribution to Human Rights: The Natural Law Foundation, 1 
AVA MARIA L. REV. 159, 163 (2003) (“[I]nternational law has a strong foundation in the natural law 
tradition that is very much at the core of international human rights.”)  
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Declaration of Human Rights,179 and subsequent treaties.  The U.N. Charter and the 
Universal Declaration gave voice to many of the rights contained in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights on an international level.180
The United States was a leader in the development of international human rights. 
It hosted the conference at which the United Nations Charter was drafted.  It was one of 
the five victor countries that conducted the Nuremburg trials - the first time individuals 
were held accountable for war crimes before an international criminal tribunal.  The 
United States participated in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well 
as the more detailed International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  While the United 
States has sometimes been reluctant to ratify certain international human rights treaties, 
such as the recent Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has remained 
deeply involved in the development of international human rights norms, including the 
drafting of the ICC Charter.
3. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Consistently Used Foreign and 
International Law throughout Its History
While it is clear that the United States government has been an active participant 
in developing the rules of international human rights law, the question remains: what 
178
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impact has that international activity had on courts and the development of the law in the 
United States?  As American University Dean Claudio Grossman stated in his opening 
remarks in the recent Scalia-Beyer Discussion regarding the Supreme Court’s use of 
international and foreign law: “It is important to recognize that since the early 19th
century, Supreme Court cases have relied, without much fuss or fanfare, on certain 
foreign materials.”181  Several scholars have documented the Supreme Court’s use of 
foreign and international legal materials throughout its history.182  Accordingly, I do not 
propose to review that entire history here.  However, one particularly interesting recent 
study demonstrated that 25% of the early Supreme Court’s docket consisted of cases 
involving foreign and international issues and concluded that the early Supreme Court 
was in the day-to-day business of foreign affairs.183
Dean of Yale Law School, Harold Hongju Koh, suggests that, historically, the 
Supreme Court “has regularly looked to foreign and international precedents as an aid to 
constitutional interpretation in at least three situations,” which he calls, “parallel rules,” 
181
 Remarks of Claudio Grossman, Dean of the American University College of Law, Transcript of 
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“empirical light,” and “community standard.”184   First, the Court has noted when legal 
rules in the United States “parallel those of other nations, particularly those with similar 
legal and social traditions.”185  Second, “empirical light” refers to the fact that the Court 
“has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have 
applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly 
comparable circumstances.”186  Third, the Court has considered international and foreign 
legal sources when a U.S constitutional concept such as “cruel and unusual” or “due 
process” by its own terms implicitly refers to a community standard.187  Thus, there is 
ample evidence that the Supreme Court has frequently referred to foreign and 
international sources throughout its history and has used these sources to assist in 
interpreting federal statutes, treaties, and the U.S. Constitution.
4. Implications for the Future
The changes in the understanding of the meaning of sovereignty and the 
development of international human rights law described above have far-reaching 
implications for nation-states such as the United States.  As Professor Reisman has stated: 
“By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of sovereigns to the protection 
of the people, [international human rights law] works qualitative changes in virtually 
every component.”188  This new concept of sovereignty even affects the relationship 
between national and international law.  Because international law acts to create and 
184
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define a sovereign state and its duty to protect its people, the actions of any particular 
state carried out in fulfillment of that duty must be measured by both international and 
national law standards.   It has long been established that national law may not be 
invoked to justify violations of international law.189  If the international law concept of 
sovereignty is used to assert federal power, as has been done by the Supreme Court in the 
cases cited above, then it also should be used to inform the meaning of limits on 
sovereignty suggested by international human rights norms.190  As Professor Ronald 
Brand has stated: “If the role of the sovereign is to provide security, and strengthening the 
international rule of law results in increased security, then the role of the sovereign must 
be to strengthen the international rule of law.”191  This mandate applies to all branches of 
government – the legislative, executive, and judiciary.  Thus, U.S. courts, as one branch 
of the federal government, share in the sovereign duty to protect and are therefore derelict 
in their duties if they do not judge the lawfulness of government action by both national 
and international law standards, including international human rights law.
V. Objections to the Use of Foreign and International Law
Despite this frequent use of foreign and international law by the Supreme Court, 
Justice Scalia remains unconvinced of the merits of looking to foreign law in particular.  
He has two responses to the argument that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were 
influenced by foreign law.  First, he argues that the Framers “didn’t have a lot of respect 
189 See Id. at 874.  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27.
190 See Christenson, supra note __ , at 29-30.
191
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for many of the rules in European countries.”192  However, he does admit that the framers 
“used a lot of foreign law,” which is evidenced by discussions of the Swiss and German 
systems in the Federalist Papers.193  He further states that while foreign law may be 
useful in devising a constitution, it is not useful in interpreting one.194  Justice Scalia 
argues that when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the appropriate judicial task is to 
understand what it meant when it was adopted and that the meaning of the Constitution 
does not change over time.195
To perform the task of determining the Constitution’s original meaning, Justice 
Scalia admits that one must look to foreign sources to determine what the constitution 
meant when it was drafted; however, he would limit that inquiry to “Old English law.”196
Although the Federalist Papers are full of references to foreign law and the law of 
192
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nations,197 Justice Scalia only allows for reliance on “Old English law” because many 
constitutional phrases, such as due process, are taken from “Old English law.” 198
However, English law was not formed in isolation any more than American law has been.  
It was influenced by Roman law, other European law and the law of nations.199
Moreover, many of the Framers were aware of and influenced by the French Revolution 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.200  Thus, even under an originalist theory of 
interpretation, in order to fully understand what the Framers had in mind, it is likely that 
we need to look beyond just “Old English law” to other foreign systems to understand 
what these words meant when the Constitution was drafted.201
Justice Scalia ascribes to a textualist theory of interpretation, which he has 
described as follows: “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be 
construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all this fairly means.”202
In order to determine what constitutes a “reasonable” interpretation, it is likely that an 
interpreter will consider common methods of interpretation such as considering the 
ordinary meaning of a word, the intent of the framers, and the context in which the words 
are used, among other possible sources of information.  Because the framers of the 
197 See, e.g., Jay John, THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 10.  (“It is of high importance to the peace of America, 
that she observe the law of nations towards all these Powers.”) 
198
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Constitution were influenced by natural law and the law of nations, using this method of 
interpretation opens the door to consider such sources in determining what interpretation 
is reasonable.
In any event, a static originalist theory of the Constitution is a bankrupt method of 
interpretation for those who were not included in the early Constitutional experiment.  As 
Professor Louis Henkin rightly points out, the social compact made at the time of the 
founding of our nation was made by only a small portion of the inhabitants of the United 
States.203  Only property owners were allowed to vote.  Poor men, slaves, and women 
were excluded.  Therefore, the original social compact lacks a certain amount of 
legitimacy for these groups.  While the framers of the Constitution laid a very worthwhile 
foundation, why should today’s citizens be bound by the values of a minority group that 
lived over 200 years ago?  As Henkin has argued: “The Constitution as social compact 
requires a contemporary compact by the people today.”204  The continuing legitimacy of 
the Constitution may depend on whether it accurately expresses the will and values of the 
people today.  
Using international human rights law to inform the meaning of the Constitution 
today may actually increase that constitutional legitimacy because the United States has 
been a leader in helping to create that law and thus it reflects our more contemporary 
values.  International human rights law is inclusive of all the groups mentioned above 
who were excluded from the original social compact.  Today, there are numerous 
203 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __  , at 91.
204 Id. at 103.
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international treaties specifically designed to guard against racial discrimination205 and to 
protect the rights of women.206
Justice Scalia also is concerned that using foreign law is dangerous because U.S. 
judges will not be familiar with the surrounding jurisprudence such that they are likely to 
misunderstand the foreign rules.207  While this might be a danger, it would seem that the 
answer is not to discard the use of foreign law, but to be better educated about it.  It is 
really the job of the attorneys in any given case to educate the court about any applicable 
law and that includes foreign and international law.208
Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s objection to references to international law in recent 
cases such as Atkins and Lawrence is inconsistent with his acceptance of the supremacy 
of U.S. treaty law.   The United States is a party to the ICCPR, which makes it part of the 
supreme law of the land.209  In joining the ICCPR, the United States undertook an 
obligation to take any steps necessary to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights set forth in the ICCPR.210  Article 7 of the ICCPR 
states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
205 E.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S., 
5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
206 E.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 
19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
207
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or punishment.”211  Prior to the Atkins decision, the Human Rights Committee, a body 
created by the ICCPR to monitor compliance with the Convention,212 expressed regret 
that the United States did not protect mentally retarded persons from the death penalty.213
While the United States has made a reservation to the ICCPR with respect to the 
imposition of the death penalty, there is some doubt regarding whether its reservation is 
valid as a matter of treaty law.214  But even if the reservation is valid as a legal matter, the 
widespread acceptance among the nations of the world of the treaty’s ban on the death 
penalty is certainly evidence of evolving standards of decency and should inform our 
view of acceptable treatment of mentally retarded persons.
In addition, the European Union’s amicus brief establishing overwhelming 
disapproval for the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders provides evidence of custom and general principles of law in this area.  
Because international law is part of our law, the Supreme Court had a duty to examine 
the practices of the world community to determine whether those practices may establish 
an international rule that is binding on the United States. 215
211
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In his recent confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern 
about the use of foreign law, suggesting that it does not limit judicial discretion because 
“you can find anything you want . . . As somebody said in a different context, looking at 
foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out you’re your 
friends.”216   While Justice Roberts has expressed a valid concern about the use of foreign 
law generally, where there is virtually unanimous consensus among the rest of the world 
condemning an action like the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles or the 
mentally retarded, his point is not as well taken.
As in Atkins, the majority’s reference to international law in Lawrence was 
entirely appropriate.  First, references in Lawrence to non-U.S. sources were made to 
rebut claims made by other justices in similar cases in order to establish equal treatment 
of the issue.  The majority in Lawrence used foreign and international law to rebut Chief 
Justice Burger’s claims regarding the historical condemnation of homosexual practices in 
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards in Bowers v. Hardwick. 217  Thus, the 
majority was not doing anything that had not been done before.
Second, such references were appropriate because the United States is bound by 
international treaty obligations to respect the right of privacy in one’s home and to 
provide for equal protection of the law.  In these regards, Article 17 of the ICCPR 
provides that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or 
216 Confirmation of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301210.html.
217
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reputation,” and that: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”218  Article 26 of the ICCPR further provides: “All persons are 
equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law.”219  Even Justice Scalia should be willing to admit that ratified treaty obligations 
ought to inform our understanding of these rights.
A misperception may exist that because the U.S. Senate declared articles 1-27 of 
the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, the entire treaty is not enforceable by U.S. courts 
and therefore should not be used by U.S. courts in their decision-making.   While the self-
executing treaty doctrine does prevent litigants from bringing a claim based on the non-
self-executing portions of a treaty, the self-executing treaty doctrine does not bar courts 
from taking into account the United States’ treaty obligations altogether.220  When the 
President of the United States signs a treaty and two-thirds of the Senators give their 
consent to that treaty, the United States has expressed its political will that the United 
States is in agreement with the treaty’s statements regarding international rights and 
duties.  A ratified treaty creates binding international legal obligations for the United 
States even if it is not directly enforceable in U.S. courts.  The treaty becomes part of the 
Supreme Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause and will trump inconsistent state 
laws.  U.S. courts have recognized that even when a treaty contemplates further action by 
the other branches of government, “the judicial branch should certainly attempt to reflect 
218
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in its decisionmaking the spirit as well as the letter of an international agreement to which 
the United States is a party.”221
The federal courts have long stated that they will not assume that Congress 
intends to violate the United States’ international obligations.222  Accordingly, where 
there are competing interpretations of a federal statute and a treaty to which the U.S. is a 
party, the courts will adopt the interpretation that attempts to reconcile the two.223  U.S. 
courts likewise should use the language of a treaty to which the United States is a party to 
inform the understanding of individual rights under the Constitution and choose an 
interpretation that reconciles the two whenever possible.    Doing so will assist the United 
States in avoiding violations of its international obligations.  It is also consistent with the 
democratic will as expressed by the legislative and executive branches when they ratified 
the treaty.
The United States also is bound by any relevant customary international law 
separate and apart from its treaty obligations.224  Despite this long-established principle, 
some scholars and judges are uncomfortable with the application of customary 
international law, perhaps because customary international rules are not written 
“positive” laws, or because they can be vague and rest on diffuse sources that are hard to 
find. 225  Treaties often contain very vague and broadly worded obligations as well, yet 
221
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they are still considering binding “law.”  Furthermore, while it is laudable that the law be 
known and available to any interested person, difficulty in finding the law cannot be 
determinative of its character as law.  And while it is true that customary international 
law often cannot be found in one place like a treaty, the rules of customary international 
law are often written down in diplomatic correspondence, executive orders, and similar 
documents.  In fact, the U.S. government has often made public statements officially 
accepting the binding nature of certain rules of customary international law that have 
been codified in treaties which the United States has not ratified, such as the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties226 and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.227
Some judges and scholars also have expressed concerns about the political 
foundations of customary international law believing that is not well grounded because it 
is not expressly made the law of the land in the Constitution and is not approved by the 
Senate or Congress.228  While it is true that the supremacy clause of the Constitution only 
mentions treaties and not customary international law, the Constitution does take into 
226 See, e.g., Rovine, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1973, at 307, 482-83 (1974).  
See also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 
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Turner, Assistant Secretary of State, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), 
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account customary international law in at least one other place, i.e., its reference to 
offenses against the laws of nations in Article I.229  Furthermore, the Executive Branch, 
which is charged with taking a primary role in foreign affairs, is daily involved in the 
creation of the rules of customary international law through its practices and 
pronouncements.  Thus, it is perfectly appropriate for U.S. courts to continue to ascertain 
and apply customary international law just as they have done for more than two centuries.
A similar objection that has been raised with respect to the use of foreign legal 
materials is that foreign legal materials have no democratic provenance or connection to 
the U.S. legal system and thus lack democratic accountability.230  Justice Breyer responds 
to this concern by stating that the court relies on many extrinsic sources in constitutional 
interpretation which lack a democratic base, including the work of legal scholars.231
Thus, using foreign or international materials is no worse.  More importantly, however, 
he points out that transnational law is created by the interaction of many constituencies, 
such as the interested public, affected groups, specialists, legislatures, and others.232
“That is the democratic process in action.”233  Persons and groups in the United States 
participate in this process.234  The United States, as the most powerful state in the 
international system, has a predominant role in creating the rules of international law, 
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whether by negotiating and drafting treaties or by its conduct leading to the creation of 
customary international law.  Thus, with respect to international law, the United States’ 
legislative and executive branches both have a role in creating the rules and can be held 
accountable for their actions in this regard.
Thus, concerns that anti-democratic processes may influence U.S. judges rings 
much truer with respect to foreign legal materials than with respect to international
materials, because the democratically elected bodies and other groups in the United 
States participate in the formation of international legal rules.  Furthermore, the United 
States can further alleviate any anti-democratic concerns by being a full and vigorous 
participant in developing transnational law in the future.235
The United States may even influence foreign legal materials to the extent that 
foreign legislatures and judges take into account what other countries are doing when 
fashioning their own rules.  Because the United States is the most powerful country in the 
world in the present time and because historically, it has a long history of democratic 
governance and protection of individual rights, it is likely that the United States is one of 
the countries whose practices will be considered.236
As a general proposition, however, international law does have more legitimacy 
in the U.S. legal system than foreign law because the U.S. has a greater role in shaping 
international law than foreign law.237  As a result, there are different considerations at 
235 See Id. at 56-57.
236
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work with respect to the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.  In the Knight 
v. Florida death penalty case, Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he 
suggested some standards for the use of foreign law. 238  He suggests the use of foreign 
law is appropriate in two situations.  First, it is appropriate when there exists a roughly 
comparable question and there is a transnational or global aspect to the case, there are 
shared standards, or world opinion is implicated.  Second, the use of foreign law is 
appropriate when roughly comparable legal standards exist, i.e., when the external or 
foreign norms resonate internally.  Justice Breyer suggests that this last situation is most 
likely to occur with respect to Europe and its former colonies because of our shared 
human rights heritage.239
These suggestions are worthy of consideration.  However, use of foreign law 
should be approached with particular caution.  A specific nation’s laws reflect that 
nation’s history, culture, and legal system.  Thus, any one nation’s legal rules are likely to 
be of limited value to another nation with a different history, culture and legal system.  
However, if a worldwide survey is conducted and many or most nations of the world 
have adopted a particular legal rule, that rule will reflect a consensus derived from many 
different cultures and legal system and will likely be more useful and persuasive.
Finally, persons on both sides of the debate agree that part of what is driving this 
debate regarding the use of international and foreign law is a concern that such law will 
be used by judges in an unprincipled manner to support the judges’ personal
238
 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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viewpoints.240  Justice Breyer responds to this concern by arguing that a good way to 
counter the possibility of judges imposing their own moral values is for judges to look 
outside themselves and see how society is dealing with the issue – including looking to 
foreign societies and international law.241  Moreover, it may be argued that international 
law is a more effective interpretive tool than many other external sources a judge may use 
because rules of international law are “a product of years of distillation of principles 
formed through international consensus,” that are evidenced by state practice and 
agreements that articulate the relevant principles.242  As a result, reliance on a rule of 
international law may actually reduce an individual judge’s subjectivity when interpreting 
constitutional provisions.243
For all these reasons, it is incorrect to suggest that references to international and 
foreign law have no place in U.S. Constitutional interpretation.
VI. Why should the Supreme Court continue to use international and foreign 
law?
Thus far, this article has established the political and historical bases for the 
incorporation of international law and to a lesser extent, foreign law, principles into U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence and has described both the historical and recent use of 
international and foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court.  It also has responded to the 
concerns of critics.  This section provides some reasons why the Supreme Court should 
continue to use international and foreign law in the future. 
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The most important reason supporting the Supreme Court’s continued use of 
international law is that the Constitution requires it.  As noted above, the Constitution 
makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land on par with federal statutes.244  When 
the political branches have come together and agreed to sign and ratify a treaty, the 
Supreme Court should give deference to the judgment of the other branches as to the 
rules of international law expressed in that treaty and should assist the United States in 
complying with its treaty obligations by adopting an interpretation that is consistent with 
those treaty obligations whenever possible.245
Even when the Constitution does not expressly incorporate international law, 
federal statutes may, such as in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act246 or the Alien 
Tort Statute.247 It also seems fairly uncontroversial that when the U.S. Supreme Court is 
interpreting a treaty, it should take into account the practice of states and prior judicial 
decisions interpreting the same treaty made by courts of other parties to the treaty 
because such evidence would be relevant and useful evidence of the meaning of the 
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treaty.248  Thus, the Supreme Court should continue to use international and foreign legal 
sources when it is required to do so by the Constitution or by statute.
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court must continue to ascertain and apply 
customary international law principles when called for by the Constitution or by federal 
statute.  For example, the Court may need to consider customary international law 
pursuant to the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to define and punish 
offenses against the law of nations,249 as it did in United States v. Smith.250
The recent case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain provides a timely example of a 
statutory requirement to consider customary international law.  In Sosa, the Supreme 
Court was required by the Alien Tort Statute to determine whether particular conduct 
constituted a tort under the law of nations.251  The Supreme Court affirmed that it was 
required to ascertain and apply a modern-day understanding of international torts, at least 
where the norm of international character is accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with specificity.252
Use of international treaty law and the customary international law of human 
rights to inform U.S. constitutional rights jurisprudence also can be justified under and 
reconciled with many classic theories of constitutional interpretation.253  From an 
248 See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
249 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8.
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originalist perspective, such usage is appropriate because the founding fathers were 
heavily influenced by foreign and international law and incorporated some of these 
sources and ideas into the Constitution (although a “hard” originalist might only allow for 
international law as it existed at the time of the writing of the Constitution).254  A natural 
law proponent should be open to using international human rights law to inform U.S. 
U.S. individual rights jurisprudence because of their shared natural law foundations and 
their mutual influence on the development of the other.  From a structural 
majoritarianism perspective, it may be argued that appropriate use of foreign and 
international law where it has been created and approved by the political branches of the 
federal government demonstrates proper deference to those branches.  On the other hand, 
an interpretive majoritarianism view might use present-day concepts of sovereignty and 
international human rights to facilitate our understanding of the meaning of a “living” 
constitution that changes over time in response to societal changes.  Finally, a pragmatic 
approach might encourage examination of foreign legal experiences to better understand 
the consequences of different legal solutions for common legal problems.255
Moreover, using international and foreign law will assist the U.S. government in 
carrying out its duty to protect the people.   Modern conceptions of sovereignty require 
that the sovereign state take seriously its responsibility to protect its citizens.  This 
conception of sovereignty places a duty on states to ask if they are fulfilling this 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES §§ 1.101–1.104 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2000) 
(providing an historical overview of constitutional theories). 
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obligation.256 Because human rights are rights, and not aspirations, the government has 
an obligation to protect such rights.257  While many international human rights are said to 
be universal and do not differ substantively in different national legal systems, they 
depend on national governments for their protection.258 If the state is not providing a 
level of protection for human rights that has been widely adopted elsewhere in the world, 
perhaps it is time for the state to reexamine why this is the case.  Such an examination 
does not necessarily require a change in the law, as there may be important and justifiable 
reasons that a state has chosen a particular legal rule, (such as competing human rights 
values), but at least requiring that examination could force a state to confront its laws and 
practices and have to justify them to its own polity and to the world.259
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court should take international human rights norms 
into account because it is good foreign relations policy.  Taking international human 
rights norms into account serves foreign relations purposes by allowing the United States 
to maintain a position of leadership in international affairs, earn a “good” reputation, 
encourage good human rights practices in other countries, promote conditions conducive 
to trade, and encourage peace and stability.260
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court should continue to consider international and 
foreign legal materials in its work because it is sometimes required to do so by the 
256 As Thomas Jefferson stated, governments are instituted “to secure these rights.”   HENKIN, THE AGE OF 
RIGHTS, supra note __, at 87.
257 HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __, at 3. 
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constitution or by federal statute, because it increases the legitimacy of the court’s 
jurisprudence, and because it is good foreign relations policy.
VII. How should international law by used by Supreme Court in the future?
At the outset of the article, I noted that one criticism of the Supreme Court’s use 
of foreign and international law it that there is a lack of guidelines or standards as to 
when use of such sources is appropriate.  I believe this criticism is valid.  While some 
attempts have been made to offer such guidelines, they remain incomplete.  Accordingly, 
in this final section, I will offer some additional ideas for guidelines or standards that may 
be useful in assessing the appropriateness of the use of foreign and international law 
sources by the Supreme Court in the future.
Before embarking on that endeavor, however, I wish to offer one caveat.  Inherent 
in the U.S.’s tripartite system of government is a certain reliance on the wisdom and 
integrity of the judges who sit on the federal bench.  They are appointed for life in part 
because we expect them to act as checks on the other branches of government without 
fear of retaliation.  On a daily basis, they are asked to interpret ambiguous laws, whether 
they be domestic or international.  This system allows the judges a certain level of 
discretion when deciding cases, regardless of whether international or foreign law is used 
by the judges is involved.  Thus, no absolute or rigid guidelines for the use of 
international or foreign law are possible or even desirable.
Justice Scalia has complained, however, that there is a lack of international 
consensus on many legal rules and that the U.S. Supreme Court lack criteria to assist in 
deciding when and which of these foreign rules to use.  This criticism is a potentially 
troubling, but no more so than Justice Scalia’s concerns with respect to the use of any 
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external source in constitutional interpretation.  As both Justices Scalia and Breyer point 
out, using international or foreign law is similar to using any other external source, such 
as legislative history, in interpreting a vague or ambiguous constitutional term or 
phrase.261  The court has been able to successfully use legislative history when it has 
found such history to be persuasive or useful.  In this regard, Justice Breyer argues that 
the Supreme Court cites many sources in its jurisprudence and that the main guideline for 
using these external sources is their usefulness.262  Likewise, it does not seem like an 
insurmountable hurdle for the justices to devise some loose guidelines for the use of 
international and foreign law in their jurisprudence.263  Set forth below are a few 
suggestions in this regard.
A. International and Foreign Law as an Interpretive Aid
First, international and foreign law may be used as an interpretive aid when the 
language of the Constitution standing alone does not answer a question.  Where the text 
of the Constitution is perfectly clear (e.g., the necessary age of 35 to become President of 
the United States), there usually is no need to consider extrinsic sources.  However, in 
many cases already discussed herein, the text is not perfectly clear on its face.  Phrases 
like liberty, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment all invite interpretation and 
explanation.  In such cases, it has been common for the Supreme Court to look to external 
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sources to aid in its interpretation of these vague or ambiguous phrases.  International 
law, particularly international human rights norms, may be treated as an external source 
to be used in interpretation of vague or ambiguous terms.264  As demonstrated above, it is 
particularly appropriate to turn to international human rights law as an interpretive tool 
given the common historical and theoretical foundations of U.S. individual rights and 
international human rights law.
Legal positivists might object to the use of international law in this way because 
they would limit themselves to “formal sources of law, [e.g.,] those formalized precepts 
and mandates which have been promulgated or issued by a legislature, a constitutional 
convention, a court, or an administrative agency.”265  Although treaties may fit the 
definition of positive law, many other sources of international law may not.  The problem 
with limiting legal decision-makers exclusively to such formal sources of law is that 
those sources do not answer every question.266  Positive laws always contain ambiguities 
and gaps.  In such cases, what means are available to legal decision-makers to resolve 
these questions?  Legal positivists have struggled to answer this question.267  Using 
international human rights law to inform U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence can help to 
solve this dilemma.268
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This is not a new idea.  The U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned the notion that 
judges may look beyond strictly positive sources of law in a number of cases.269  And as 
Justice Cardozo pointed out many years ago, many gaps in U.S. common law have been 
filled by borrowing from Roman law or other legal systems.270
B. The United States Constitution as a Floor for Human Rights
Another possibility would be to treat the relationship between foreign and 
international law similarly to the relationship between state constitutions and the federal 
constitution.  In the U.S. federalist system, the U.S.Constitution provides a floor for the 
protection of individual rights below which states may not go.  States may provide more 
protection for individual rights pursuant to their own laws and constitutions, but not less.  
Foreign and international law could be treated similarly in that the U.S. Supreme Court 
could refer to foreign and international law standards when they provide a higher level of 
protection than the U.S. Constitution, but would never be forced to adopt a foreign or 
international law standard that is less protective than that of the Constitution.  In this way, 
the Supreme Court would be assisting the United States in fulfilling its sovereign duty to 
protect.
This approach would satisfy the objection that application of foreign or 
international law would lead to the adoption of practices of a country with a poor human 
rights record.  However, it still does not answer the more difficult questions involving 
269 See.e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (resulting in significant 
innovation in the law of unfair competition). 
270 BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note __ at 353 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 123 (New Haven 1921).
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competing human rights, such as those of a mother and an unborn child in abortion 
jurisprudence.
Of course, it also is settled law that “treaties are subject to the constitutional 
limitations that apply to all exercises of federal power, principally, the prohibitions of the 
Bill of Rights.”271  The Treaty Power does not extend “so far as to authorize what the 
Constitution forbids.”272  Taking this proposition together with the Ninth Amendment’s 
admonishment that the people retain rights in addition to those enumerated in the 
Constitution, we see that international law can add to the list of individual rights retained 
by the people and can be used to interpret or give meaning to rights that are enumerated 
in the Constitution, but cannot take away rights enumerated in the Constitution.  
C. International and Foreign Law as an Educational Tool
Several of the Supreme Court justices and scholars have pointed out ways in 
which international and foreign law can be a useful educational tool.  First, surveying 
international and foreign legal sources can show developing trends in the law.  Second, it 
can suggest new ways of approaching common problems.273  Third, it can stimulate 
thinking about different solutions.  Fourth, a non-U.S. legal source may suggest a 
persuasive line of logic.  Thus, international and foreign legal sources can be of 
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tremendous educational value, regardless of whether such sources are formally relied 
upon or cited as any kind of authority for the court’s opinion.
VIII. Conclusion
Individual rights in the United States are interrelated with the developing system 
of international human rights.  Both share a common ancestry deriving from natural law 
principles and political theories of sovereignty.  Proper understandings of sovereignty 
recognize that sovereign states have both powers and responsibilities and that the primary 
responsibility of the government is the protection of the people who created that 
government and endowed it with its sovereignty in the first place.  Thus, governments, 
including courts, have a duty to take international law, including international human 
rights, into account when interpreting national constitutions intended for the protection of 
the people.
The implications for the United States are that while international law does not 
trump the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court should consider international law rules in 
constitutional interpretation whenever the political branches of government have adopted 
international agreements or participated in the creation of customary international law 
rules that express the United States’ position on human rights.  It also should use 
international law as an interpretive tool to inform its understanding of vague or 
ambiguous constitutional provisions.  Under the dictates of sovereignty theory, the Court 
would never be forced to adopt a foreign practice that is less protective of the people 
because that would be contrary to the entire purpose for which the government was 
created.  Rather, the Supreme Court should continue to use foreign and international law 
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to expand our conception of human rights consistently with the Constitution and should 
use international law as an interpretive and educational tool in appropriate circumstances.
